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The Coevolution of Transnational
Corporations and. Institutions
SARIANNA M. LUNDAN*
ABSTRACT
While economic theories of the firm have traditionally focused on the
ownership of assets, the increasing use of contractual partnerships is
beginning to challenge our conception of the firm by emphasizing its
coordinating role. In structuring their contracts, as well as in managing
the relationships governed by the contracts, firms try to mitigate
uncertainties that could destroy the value-adding potential of such
transactions. These uncertainties may be specific to the transaction
partner, but they might also arise from the institutional context of the
contracting parties, particularly in the case of transactions that cross
borders. The coevolutionary process whereby firms both adjust to and
shape the institutional constraints facing them results in new hybrid
forms of governance, which contribute to the body of private
transnational law. By studying how firms mitigate the uncertainties in
their contractual relationships, empirical research can yield new insights
about the emergence and impact of private law.
INTRODUCTION
The integrated industrial enterprises that emerged from the first
global economy' grew by horizontal and vertical integration, as well as
by expanding abroad in order to take full benefit of the economies of
scale and scope. To cope with the growing complexities created by the
firm's expansion, emerging industrial giants such as DuPont, ICI, and
Siemens started to experiment with the multidivisional (M-form)
organization. This process began before World War I, but came into full
* Professor for International Management and Governance, Faculty of Business
Studies and Economics, University of Bremen, Germany. Please send mail to
s.lundan@uni-bremen.de.
1. The first global economy peaked on the eve of World War I, and the same level of
outward direct investment stock to global GDP was not reached until the 1990s.
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force in the interwar years. After World War II, with the help of the
consultants at McKinsey, the M-form was subsequently transplanted to
firms in Europe as part of the process of reconstruction. 2
With fax and the Internet replacing the telephone, and with cheap
air travel and container shipping replacing the railroads, the second
global economy began to take shape in the early 1980s, reaching its
peak before the onset of the current financial crisis. However, unlike the
first global economy, the second global economy does not have a
similarly emblematic organizational form associated with it. In the
1980s, transnational corporations (TNCs) underwent a period of
experimentation with matrix organizational forms, only to return to
variations of the multidivisional form.3 However, with the increase in
outsourcing over the past decade or so, there is now a greater variety of
organizational forms in use, which fall under the heading of network
organizations.4
In broad terms, network organizations consist of an internal
ownership-based network and an external contractual network of
cooperative partners. At one end, this includes the conventional M-form
divisional organizations that have simply responded to the greater
availability of outsourcing partners by increasing the proportion of
outside suppliers they use. At the other end are organizations, such as
Nike or Apple, whose main value added at the headquarters consists of
a combination of branding, design, and research and development
(R&D) activities, and who contract for the manufacturing of their
products by original equipment manufacturers (OEMs).
This shift in the governance5 forms adopted by large firms, and
particularly those firms whose activities cross borders, has important
implications for the theory of the firm, as well as for the institutional
structure in which firms operate. Specifically, this article will put
forward three interlinked propositions:
2. See generally THE AMERICANISATION OF EUROPEAN BUSINESS: THE MARSHALL PLAN
AND THE TRANSFER OF US MANAGEMENT MODELS (Matthias Kipping & Ove Bjarnar eds.,
1998) (presenting evidence of the role of McKinsey in the dissemination of U.S.
management practices).
3. See D. Eleanor Westney, Geography as a Design Variable, in THE FUTURE OF THE
MULTINATIONAL COMPANY 128, 130-33 (Julian Birkinshaw et al. eds., 2003).
4. See generally D. Eleanor Westney & Srilata Zaheer, The Multinational Enterprise
as an Organization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 349 (Alan M.
Rugman & Thomas L. Brewer eds., 2001) (discussing the development of different forms of
organization over the last few decades in response to changes in international business).
5. By governance I mean the tools used to induce order in exchange relations when
potential conflicts due to information asymmetry or other reasons threaten the
possibilities for cooperation.
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1. The increasing use of contractual partnerships
emphasizing the firm's coordinating role rather than its
ownership of assets. More specifically, any theory of the
firm that takes as its starting point the difference in the
transaction costs over the market and inside the
hierarchy has to account for the increasing use of
external contracts in the coordinating function of the
firm.
2. The firm that coordinates an increasing proportion of
activities across the external market interface, rather
than within the internal hierarchy, has external effects
on other firms in the market by lowering the transaction
costs of using the market.
3. The increasing amount of contractual activity opens
up numerous opportunities for firms to shape the body of
private transnational law. Consequently, by studying
how firms mitigate the uncertainties in their contractual
relationships, empirical research can yield new insights
about the emergence and impact of private law.
This article is organized as follows. The first section discusses the
implications of the changing structure of TNCs, particularly in reference
to transaction cost economics. In this predominant theory of the TNC,
the firm is seen as a nexus of contracts, where market transactions are
replaced by employment relations inside the firm if the transaction costs
of using the market are excessive. In this view, the internalization of
market transactions in response to market failure6 is seen as the raison
d'itre of the firm. Since I will argue for the need to account for the
implications of the increasing use of external contracts on our
conception of the firm, I will offer an alternative view of the TNC as a
system of coordinated activities. Such a system consists of both
ownership-based and contractual activities and spans across multiple
levels between subsidiaries, TNC headquarters, and the home and host
markets.
The second section will argue that the reflexive process whereby the
TNC as a system both adjusts to and shapes its operating environment
results in a coevolutionary trajectory that contributes to broader
6. When market failures occur, it is due to factors preventing international markets
from functioning perfectly-including both structural market imperfections (e.g., cartels
and government interventions) and such endemic market shortcomings as uncertainty,
asymmetrical information, bounded rationality, and externalities.
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transformations in the home and host countries. One important way in
which TNCs are shaping the market context is through the different
governance mechanisms they employ to deal with the uncertainties that
arise in their external cooperative relationships. While such
relationships are contractual, there is emerging evidence showing that
the contracts covering such activities are not uniform, but quite
heterogeneous, suggesting that firms are developing novel solutions to
the specific uncertainties they encounter in a particular market
context.7 As these solutions become articulated and codified, they
become diffused within the firm itself and to its external partners. Over
time, such practices may also become more widely diffused, whether
deliberately or incidentally, and it is this process of diffusion that in the
aggregate shapes the body of transnational private law that firms help
create.
In the third section, I pay particular attention to the cross-border
dimension of the firm's activities and the differences between developed
markets, where private ordering takes place in the shadow of well-
functioning public ordering, and emerging markets, where private
ordering might be replacing or at least mitigating some of the
deficiencies in public ordering. I conclude by briefly reviewing the
implications of my argument, and by suggesting ways in which research
combining legal and business perspectives can help to uncover the
extent and forms of these extralegal activities conducted by firms. I
begin by examining the changes in the theory of the TNC in response to
increasing contractual activity.
I. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AS COORDINATED SYSTEMS
Changes in the structure and form of TNCs are manifestations of
the efforts of firms to identify practices that can mitigate the
uncertainties presented by their environment.8 The transformation of
the TNC from an ownership-based entity to a network firm has involved
three types of changes that affect the firm boundary. First, the
boundaries of firms have become more porous, consisting of a variety of
equity-based and contractual interfaces with suppliers and customers.
In addition to redefining the boundaries of traditional TNCs, we have
seen the emergence (mainly in Asia) of new network-type TNCs.9
7. See John Hagedoorn & Geerte Hesen, Contractual Complexity and the Cognitive
Load of R&D Alliance Contracts, 6 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 818, 818-19 (2009).
8. See, e.g., Peer Zumbansen, The Parallel Worlds of Corporate Governance and Labor
Law, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 261, 262-63 (2006).
9. See JOHN. A. MATHEWS, DRAGON MULTINATIONAL: A NEW MODEL FOR GLOBAL
GROWTH 139-44 (2002).
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Second, there has been a notable increase in the internal diversity of
TNCs as a result of a continued devolution of responsibility to the
subsidiary level.' 0 As a result of knowledge generation at the subsidiary
level, the TNC parent is presented with new challenges for integrating
the knowledge and material flows within the TNC network." Third, in
addition to relationships between TNCs and government, TNCs have
begun to engage in a greater variety of nonmarket interactions
involving civil society and quasi-governmental institutions.12 In
response to these changes, the theory of the TNC has had to come to
terms with the fact that transactions in multiple markets (markets for
assets, asset services, and firms) determine the governance form and
that differential ownership advantages are likely to influence who
internalizes what.'3
The seminal contributions of Buckley and Casson,14 Rugman,15
Teece,' 6 and Hennart'7 led internalization theory to become one of the
10. See generally Ulf Andersson & Mats Forsgren, In Search of Centre of Excellence:
Network Embeddedness and Subsidiary Roles in Multinational Corporations, 40 MGMT.
INT'L REV. 329 (2000) (presenting evidence for the emergence of designated centers of
excellence at the subsidiary level); John Cantwell & Ram Mudambi, MNE Competence-
Creating Subsidiary Mandates: An Empirical Investigation, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1109
(2005) (discussing the potential conflict between competence-creating and competence-
exploiting subsidiary mandates).
11. See Ulf Andersson et al., Balancing Subsidiary Influence in the Federative MNC: A
Business Network View, 38 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 802, 803-04 (2007); Ram Mudambi & Pietro
Navarra, Is Knowledge Power? Knowledge Flows, Subsidiary Power and Rent-Seeking
Within MNCs, 35 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 385, 387-89 (2004); Alain Verbeke & Thomas P.
Kenworthy, Multidivisional Vs. Metanational Governance of the Multinational Enterprise,
39 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 940, 943, 952 (2008).
12. See Jean J. Boddewyn, Understanding and Advancing the Concept of "Nonmarket",
42 BUS. Soc'Y 297, 318-20 (2003); Hildy Teegen et al., The Importance of Nongovernmental
Organizations (NGCs) in Global Governance and Value Creation: An International
Business Research Agenda, 35 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 463, 474-76 (2004).
13. See, e.g., Shih-Fen S. Chen, A General TCE Model of International Business
Institutions: Market Failure and Reciprocity, 41 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 935, 949-55 (2010);
Jean-Franqois Hennart, Down with MNE-Centric Theories! Market Entry and Expansion
as the Bundling of MNE and Local Assets, 40 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 1432, 1439-41, 1448-49
(2009).
14. See generally PETER J. BUCKLEY & MARK CASSON, THE FUTURE OF THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 32-65 (1976) (arguing that the internalization of the market
for knowledge-intensive intermediate inputs provides the raison d'dtre of the
multinational enterprise).
15. See generally Alan M. Rugman, Internalization as a General Theory of Foreign
Direct Investment: A Re-Appraisal of the Literature, 116 WELTWIRTSCHAFTLICHES ARCHIV
365 (1980) (discussing internalization as a general theory explaining cross-border
investment).
16. See generally David J. Teece, The Market for Know-How and the Efficient
International Transfer of Technology, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC., Nov. 1981, at
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primary theoretical foundations of the nascent field of International
Business (IB). In addition to addressing the questions of the mode of
entry and firm borders, these scholars put forward the idea that market
internalization itself was sufficient to explain the existence of the
transnational corporation.18 Internalization was thus presented as a
general theory of the firm, capable of explaining the emergence of the
TNC as a special case.
Internalization theory and the transaction cost economics (TCE)
associated with Williamson 9 developed independently of each other at
around the same time and share a number of similarities since they
both draw on the original work of Coase.20 One of the main differences
between the two approaches is that while internalization theory focuses
specifically on imperfections in the market for knowledge, TCE pays
more attention to small numbers conditions and opportunism, which are
likely to impede transactions between unaffiliated parties. However, as
Verbeke and Greidanus suggest, the idea that considerable weight
should be placed on designing governance forms that safeguard against
the pervasive opportunism of one's partners does not sit well in a
context where long-term collaborative relationships are becoming the
norm and not the exception. 21 These differences aside, both are
comparative institutional theories that seek to explain why one form of
governance substitutes for another.
When developing the eclectic or OLI paradigm, which became the
preeminent theoretical framework to explain the pattern of TNC
activity, Dunning placed considerably more emphasis on the need for
81 (highlighting the characteristics of the market for technology and the conditions for
technology transfer).
17. See generally JEAN-FRANCOIS HENNART, A THEORY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
(1982) (developing the theory of internalization from a transaction cost perspective).
18. I use the term "transnational corporation" (TNC) since it is commonly used in the
legal literature, and it is also the nomenclature used by the United Nations. However,
most contributions to the literature in economics and international business use the term
"multinational enterprise" (MNE) since the word "transnational" is sometimes associated
with a particular firm structure. See generally CHRISTOPHER A. BARTLETT & SUMANTRA
GHOSHAL, MANAGING ACRoss BORDERS: THE TRANSNATIONAL SOLUTION 83-154 (2d ed.
2002).
19. E.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 83-89 (1975); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE EcoNoMic
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 15-42 (1985).
20. See generally R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 33-55 (1988)
(presenting a seminal argument concerning the determination of the boundaries of the
firm).
21. Alain Verbeke & Nathan S. Greidanus, The End of the Opportunism Vs Trust
Debate: Bounded Reliability as a New Envelope Concept in Research on MNE Governance,
40 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 1471, 1480 (2009).
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the TNC to possess ownership advantages prior to the act of
internalization. 22 He argued that the pattern and extent of the cross-
border activities of TNCs could only be explained by the interplay
between the mobile ownership advantages of the firm (the 0-factor), the
immobile location-bound resources in the host country (the L-factor),
and the degree to which these activities are internalized (the I-factor).
In the first instance, such advantages are likely to consist of little
more than entrepreneurial judgment, which consists of the ability of the
entrepreneur to acquire information and to make judgments about its
usefulness. 23 As the firm grows by hiring more employees and procuring
additional inputs, a second kind of ownership advantage is called for
that enables efficient organization within the firm. This requires an
ability to set hierarchical incentives in a way that increases employee
commitment and maximizes output.
As the firm continues to grow in scale and scope, it is likely that in
addition to managing activities within the firm, there is a growing need
for it to manage an increasing number of subcontractors. Indeed, in
diverse fields such as construction, media, and software development,
there is no compelling reason for the firm to internalize the output of
the various input providers in the first place, since the same end result
can be achieved contractually by specifying the characteristics of the
output. Instead, extensive projects are carried out by teams consisting of
a small core of salaried employees and a large number of external
contractors. Thus the size of the firm is mitigated by its ability to
effectively coordinate the inputs of the various independent
subcontractors.
These two types of advantages correspond quite closely to the two
categories of ownership advantages outlined by Dunning.24 These are
the asset-based ownership advantages (Oa) and the transaction-based
ownership advantages (Ot). When these were introduced, the conception
of the TNC was still prominently ownership based. Thus, Oa refers to
advantages the firm owns, whether these are intellectual property
rights in the form of patents and trademarks, stocks of tacit knowledge,
or tangible property and equipment. The Ot advantages are essentially
the economies achieved by a multiplant firm over a single plant firm,
22. See generally John H. Dunning, The Eclectic Paradigm ofInternational Production:
A Restatement and Some Possible Extensions, 19 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 1 (1988) (presenting
the eclectic paradigm in its most widely cited form).
23. See MARK CASSON, THE ENTREPRENEUR: AN ECONOMIC THEORY 22-28 (1982); Mark
Casson, Entrepreneurship and the Theory of the Firm, 58 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 327, 329
(2005).
24. See generally Dunning, supra note 22, at 2-3 (discussing asset- and transaction-
based ownership advantages).
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and they also incorporate any advantages derived from transnationality
per se. This formulation of ownership advantages thus separates the
advantages based on the possession of superior competitive assets,
whether intellectual or real assets, from those that are based on the
cross-border coordination of these assets.
The transaction-based advantages (Ot) of the firm can be related
directly to the ideas of Penrose on the managerial limits to growth.25 As
firms grow, the ability of management to oversee an increasingly
diverse set of operations declines and sets the limits to further growth,
since top management cannot be expanded ad infinitum. Chandler
expressed similar ideas in his analysis of the emergence of the
multidivisional firm.26 He argued that as functionally organized firms
were diversifying both in terms of their product range as well as their
geographical reach, the multidivisional form became the preferred
structural solution to reduce the complexity facing top managers.
However, from a contemporary perspective, this analysis ignores the
increasing ability of firms to expand their value-adding activities
through contractual means, 27 which neither requires the resource
commitment nor carries the problems of hierarchical coordination
envisaged by Penrose and Chandler. Thus to the extent that the ability
to contract for output simplifies the coordination task, managers should
find it possible to control a firm of greater complexity than would be
possible only hierarchically.
While some types of Oa advantages have salvage value if the firm
were to be liquidated, any premium associated with its other Oa and Ot
advantages would be likely to disappear. However, if the firm were
acquired by another firm, part of the premium paid would be precisely
for these types of ownership advantages, with the expectation and hope
that subsequent to the merger, the merged entity would be able to
maintain similar or even higher levels of Oa and Ot advantages. That
such advantages do not always materialize reflects the fact that the
disembodied value of such advantages is difficult to assess, and
therefore the premium paid by any acquirer may overstate their
usefulness when deployed in a different context. This is particularly the
case if the acquired firm cannot be left intact, but is subject to
25. See generally EDITH PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM 46-49 (4th
ed. 2009).
26. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM 14-18 (1990).
27. See, e.g., John Cantwell, Innovation, Profits and Growth: Penrose and Schumpeter,
in THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM: THE LEGACY OF EDITH PENROSE 215, 219-20 (Christos
Pitelis ed., 2002).
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rationalization and cost cutting, which are often used to gain the desired
management transformation.
Greater reliance on transactions that extend beyond hierarchical
control poses a governance challenge. Such transactions, whether they
involve OEM production or design contracts, or various types of
outsourcing arrangements, incorporate a variety of ways to balance the
interests on both sides. 28 These may include sequential equity
purchases, mutual hostages, and various other means to align the
incentives of the contracting parties. It is likely that some firms develop
superior skills at managing such relationships that provide them with
an advantage, but such advantages are not the traditional multiplant
economies envisaged by the Ot advantages. Similar challenges are
posed by various kinds of nonmarket activities that may extend from
the simple philanthropic activities undertaken by TNCs to
multistakeholder partnerships involving governments and NGOs.
To address the capabilities required to manage such relationships,
Dunning and Lundan introduced a third category of ownership
advantages, namely institutional advantages (Oi).29 They argued that
the ability of the TNC to grow requires effective management of both
the market and nonmarket domains, and it necessitates the
simultaneous deployment of asset-based advantages, advantages of
common governance, and institutional advantages.
Oi advantages include the formal and informal institutions that
govern the value-added processes within the firm and between the firm
and its stakeholders. This might include instruments such as codes of
conduct, norms, and corporate culture, and such advantages might also
be incorporated into the incentive system of the firm. In this sense,
some of the Oi advantages resemble intangible Oa advantages, but they
relate specifically to the expectations and limits set by the institutional
framework in the home and host countries. Because of this, the cases
where Oi advantages are most visible are in connection with the
exploitation and augmentation of the firm's ownership advantages using
the nonmarket interface. Since increasing the geographical scope of the
firm also increases the institutional complexity with which it is
confronted, Dunning and Lundan argue that Oi advantages are in large
28. See generally Shih-Fen S. Chen, Extending Internalization Theory: A New
Perspective on International Technology Transfer and Its Generalization, 36 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 231 (2005) (presenting various alternative market governance mechanisms beyond
technology licensing).
29. See JOHN H. DUNNING & SARIANNA M. LUNDAN, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 131-137 (2d ed. 2008); John H. Dunning & Sarianna M. Lundan,
Institutions and the OLI Paradigm of the Multinational Enterprise, 25 ASIA PAc. J. MGMT.
573, 578-84 (2008).
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part responsible for the limited ability of many TNCs to expand beyond
their regional market.30 We now turn to the evolving interface between
TNCs and external institutions.
II. ADAPTATION AND COEVOLUTION
According to North, economic growth in the long run depends on the
development of more complex institutions to deal with the uncertainties
that arise from more complex forms of exchange, involving both market
and nonmarket actors.31 These institutional aspects have also become
increasingly interconnected over geographical space, and TNCs both
contribute to, and are affected by, the contagion effects from the
external environment that are now capable of being transmitted more
rapidly and effectively from one location to another.
TNCs have responded to the more profound nature of uncertainty in
part by shifting toward more open business network structures that
provide greater flexibility in adapting to changes. 32 In so doing, TNCs
have developed solutions for dealing with the problems of impersonal
exchange across multiple markets and the acquisition and
recombination of dispersed knowledge. The methods of organizing and
structuring relationships within and between firms, including in the
conduct of R&D, the design and enforcement of contracts, and the
management of cooperative relationships, evolve into routines or best
practices that are gradually diffused to other firms and become
institutionalized.3 3 Thus, while the institutional environment is
external to any individual firm, the process through which new
institutions are created is often initiated through the experimental
actions of individual firms. Since firms (and especially TNCs) are
increasingly interconnected with other market and nonmarket actors, a
variety of alternative experimental directions across different network
30. See Alan M. Rugman & Alain Verbeke, A Perspective on Regional and Global
Strategies of Multinational Enterprises, 35 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 3, 14 (2004).
31. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) (explaining an analytical framework describing drivers of
institutional change and the implications of this type of institutional development for
economic theory and economic history); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, UNDERSTANDING THE
PROCESS OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (2005) (developing and extending the argument that
institutions, and particularly informal institutions, are important to achieving economic
growth).
32. See HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN BUSINESS MODELS: HOW TO THRIVE IN THE NEW
INNOvATION LANDSCAPE 2-4 (2006).
33. See John H. Dunning & Sarianna M. Lundan, The Institutional Origins of Dynamic
Capabilities in Multinational Enterprises, 19 INDUS. CORP. CHANGE 1225,1226-28, 1238
(2010).
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actors increases the system-wide extent of institutional experimentation
and diversity, as well as generating novelty from within this complex
system 3
In a recent paper, Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan identify three
types of engagement between TNC and institutions.35 The first type is
institutional avoidance, in which TNCs take the external institutional
environment as a given, but in which they are able to make choices
between different institutional environments. Faced with a weak
institutional environment, characterized by a lack of accountability,
political instability, poor regulation, and deficient enforcement of the
rule of law, the response of most TNCs is likely to be characterized by
an "exit" rather than a "voice" strategy. 36 However, exceptions may
include natural resource-seeking investment and some forms of
infrastructure investment, where the number of alternative investment
locations is more limited. The prevalence of this type of behavior is
evident in the results of many studies confirming that the more
footloose forms of TNC activity are mostly concentrated in countries
characterized by good governance.3 7
The second form of engagement is institutional adaptation. As in the
previous case, the TNC treats the institutional environment as
essentially exogenous, but in this case it adjusts its own structure and
policies to better fit the environment. The means to achieve this
objective include the use of political influence and, in some cases,
bribery, but it may also involve efforts by the TNC to intentionally
emulate the behavior, commercial culture, and institutional artifacts
that are most desirable in the host country context. At the extreme, the
TNC may wish to "go native"-to become an insider in the host country
market, possibly even hiding the aspects that make it appear foreign.
In contrast to the first two cases, in the third case, the institutional
environment is assumed to be partly endogenous, and the TNC is
engaged in a process of coevolution. In institutional coevolution, while
firms may employ some of the same tactics they used under the
adaptive scenario, their objective is no longer simply to adjust, but to
effect change in the local formal and informal institutions. For example,
a TNC might engage in political activities to advance specific kinds of
regulation or market structure that give it an advantage over its
34. John A. Cantwell, John H. Dunning & Sarianna M. Lundan, An Evolutionary
Approach to Understanding International Business Activity: The Co-evolution of MNEs
and the Institutional Environment, 41 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 567, 572-74 (2010).
35. Id. at 574-78.
36. See ALBERT O. HIRscHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY 3-4 (1970).
37. See DUNNING & LUNDAN, supra note 29, at 308-09.
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competitors. In doing so, the TNC might also align itself with domestic
firms in lobbying the government for economic protection or support.
While it could be argued that this last form of institutional response
represents merely a difference in degree rather than in kind when
compared to the adaptive scenario, there are a variety of forms of
coevolution that may be observed, each involving a different balance
between adaptation and coevolution. These include the introduction of
new organizational routines and best practices that the affiliates of
TNCs have either developed locally or that are transferred to them from
elsewhere within the TNC network.38 They also embrace the
transmission of home country institutional practices that are adopted by
the TNC parent and transferred within the TNC network.39 Coevolution
may also involve activities in which the TNC engages to effect
institutional change at the supranational level. These include various
efforts to influence the standards being promoted or enforced by existing
supranational bodies, 40  as well as proactive institutional
entrepreneurship to self-regulate specific aspects of corporate
behavior. 41
Effective management of the firm's nonmarket environment is likely
to require both adaptation and active agency on the part of the TNC.
For example, NGOs and firms can become partners in creating and
legitimatizing new standards. 42 Indeed, in the area of social
responsibility, TNCs often prefer to preempt future regulation by
proposing to regulate themselves by creating codes of conduct, or being
active in endorsing other standards like the U.N. Global Compact or the
Dow Jones Sustainability Index. In other cases, new institutions gain
prominence and legitimacy through the process of imitation
(isomorphism). For example, in the legal area, the concentration of large
clients to a handful of New York and London law firms can be seen as a
38. See generally THE EMERGENCE AND IMPACT OF MNC CENTRES OF EXCELLENCE (Ulf
Holm & Torben Pedersen eds., 2000) (presenting the results of a multi-country study on
the emergence of subsidiary centers of excellence, which are subsidiaries that develop
distinct competencies that are advantageous over competitors and are often subsequently
adopted in other units of the TNC).
39. See, e.g., Lorraine Eden et al., Standards Across Borders: Crossborder Diffusion of
the Arm's Length Standard in North America, 26 AccT. ORG. & SOC'Y 1, 1-3 (2001);
Anthony Ferner et al., Institutional Theory and the Cross-national Transfer of
Employment Policy: The Case of 'Workforce Diversity' in US Multinationals, 36 J. INT'L
Bus. STUD. 304, 305-08 (2005).
40. See Ravi Ramamurti, Global Regulatory Convergence: The Case of Intellectual
Property Rights, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT RELATIONS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 341, 343 (Robert Grosse ed., 2005).
41. See Rob van Tulder & Ans Kolk, Multinationality and Corporate Ethics: Codes of
Conduct in the Sporting Goods Industry, 32 J. INT'L Bus. STuD. 267, 277 (2001).
42. Teegan et al., supra note 12, at 473-76.
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risk minimization response by firms in cases that involve very large
financial stakes. Similarly, the spread of U.S.-style commercial
arbitration has been argued to be an outcome of the use of these
practices by TNCs. 43
These three forms of engagement are not mutually exclusive, and
TNCs are likely to exhibit both adaptation and coevolution with
institutions in different home and host countries, in different industrial
sectors, and at different points in time. One would expect, however, that
adaptation would be more likely to occur in relatively stable
environments and in less innovative sectors, while more dynamic
environments are likely to both allow and require innovation and a
continuous coevolution for the firm to sustain a competitive advantage.
In a comparatively settled local environment, it is likely that,
conforming to the expectations of the neo-institutionalist approach,
subsidiaries would mainly adapt to their local surroundings. The variety
the subsidiaries introduce is likely to be accepted by other local actors,
but it is unlikely to have much impact on their behavior. By contrast, in
a faster moving environment, perhaps associated with a process of
political and institutional reform, the coevolution of TNC subsidiaries
and the institutional environment is more likely, and the variety they
introduce to the local environment is more likely to influence (as well as
be influenced by) the behavior of other agents.
In particular, an institutional system that is in flux is likely to
exhibit "institutional voids" that offer opportunities for institutional
entrepreneurship and coevolution. Consequently, in emerging markets,
TNCs might be welcomed in part because they introduce institutional
elements that are missing in the local environment. 44 By the same
token, in such dynamic environments, TNCs are more likely to be seen
as legitimate if they contribute to a transformational process that is
already ongoing. New practices introduced by TNCs can become a part
of the wider process of changing values and institutional structures in
the host country, but even in such cases, institutional entrepreneurship
by TNCs is likely to contribute only one element to the broader
restructuring underway. The next section will explore the process of
coevolution and the diffusion of new routines in more detail.
43. Cf. Olaf Dilling et al., Introduction: Private Accountability in a Globalising World,
in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL EcoNOMIC
TRANSACTIONS 2, 2-5 (Olaf Dilling et al. eds., 2008).
44. See Robert E. Hoskisson et al., Strategy in Emerging Economies, 43 AcAD. MGMT. J.
249, 252-54 (2000); Klaus E. Meyer, Perspectives on Multinational Enterprises in
Emerging Economies, 35 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 259, 259-60 (2004).
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III. THE DIFFUSION OF NEW ROUTINES
A. Antecedents to Diffusion
Seen from an evolutionary perspective, all institutional systems
represent adaptations to specific circumstances, with some features
more deeply rooted than others and no expectation that the system is in
any sense optimal. When new practices become adopted by local firms
and embedded in the institutional fabric of particular countries, it is
unlikely that such practices will remain unchanged. The ease with
which indigenous firms in the countries hosting the affiliates of TNCs
are able to absorb new practices and to fit them to the local context is
analogous to the concept of absorptive capacity, which has been found to
be an important determinant of technology creation and diffusion.45 As
in the case of technology transfer, spillovers are likely to arise as a
result of TNCs' deliberate transfer of institutional knowledge. Such
spillovers occur through demonstration and learning effects, the
transfer of employees, and "leakage" from the training provided by
TNCs to bring local suppliers or distributors in line with their global
practices. The market structure in the host country has an impact on
local firms' interest in imitating new practices, but overall, such
spillovers are an unavoidable consequence of the efforts undertaken by
TNCs to make best practices transferable within the firm.
The centrality of the agency of TNCs to the cross-border transfer of
technology is itself partly attributable to the need for the
implementation of technology to be supported by the development of
complementary institutions. Having already developed relevant
organizational routines and the tacit knowledge that has become
embedded in those routines, it is often easier for the TNC to extend
these practices into the host country environment than it would be for
an independent agent operating under license.46 By adapting its
technology and associated routines of behavior for the local
environment, the TNC also extends its own range of competence and
hence its overall innovation potential.
At the same time, it should be acknowledged that, due to time and
resource constraints, firms also frequently respond to uncertainties in
an ad hoc manner. 47 Engaging in institutional entrepreneurship incurs
45. Wesley M. Cohen & Daniel A. Levinthal, Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on
Learning and Innovation, 35 ADMIN. SCI Q. 128, 147-50 (1990).
46. See D.J. Teece, Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of
Transferring Technological Know-How, 87 EcoN. J. 242, 259-60 (1977).
47. Sidney G. Winter, Understanding Dynamic Capabilities, 24 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
991, 993 (2003).
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substantial costs that are nonrecoverable and that are likely to result in
path-dependent lock-in effects for the firm. While TNCs can learn to
transcend the "imprinting" of their home country, due to the path
dependence of their investment and search strategies, they are limited
in their ability to adjust to the institutional systems of host countries.
Thus, while the cross-border differences in institutions offer potential
opportunities for TNCs to choose the most conducive environment for
their activities, the legacy of home country institutions may result in
firms preferring a similar (rather than superior) institutional context. 48
Indeed, the findings of Rugman and Verbeke that some of the
world's largest TNCs are regional rather than global in terms of their
saleS49 are in large part due to institutional differences that are a
combination of formal market institutions and the societal norms and
expectations that underpin those institutions. In the words of Kogut,
"direct investment is the extension of the organizing principles and
capabilities of the firm across countries."50 Without detailed knowledge
of the market, and of the quality and quantity of information available
to other firms and customers throughout the value chain, it is difficult
to assess whether the business model the firm has adopted in its home
country is transferable abroad. For example, Jacobides has argued that
the failure of U.S. financial institutions (prior to the current crisis) to
expand abroad was due to a lack of understanding of the extent to which
their business models relied on a particular division of labor and the
presence of specialized intermediaries within the domestic market.51
Furthermore, successful transfer presumes that a TNC has the
ability to generate a sufficient variety of practices, to select those that
are the most viable, and to codify them to the extent that they become
transferable within the firm. Even if this is achieved, as a consequence
of the increased autonomy gained by subsidiaries that evolve toward a
higher share of competence-creating activities, problems of motivation
and control may impede subsequent transfers of knowledge within the
firm across disparate or potentially competing subunits.
48. See, e.g., Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 807, 810-11 (2006).
49. See Rugman & Verbeke, supra note 30, at 14.
50. Bruce Kogut, Learning, or the Importance of Being Inert: Country Imprinting and
International Competition, in ORGANIZATION THEORY AND THE MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATION 106, 107 (Sumantra Ghoshal & D. Eleanor Westney eds., 2d ed. 2005).
51. See Michael G. Jacobides, Playing Football in a Soccer Field: Value Chain
Structures, Institutional Modularity and Success in Foreign Expansion, 29 MANAGERIAL &
DECISION EcoN. 257, 267-69 (2008).
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B. Effects on Market Structure
In fact, the contribution made by TNCs here is a dual one. The
primary contribution of a TNC is its ability to assemble complementary
assets when the input markets are thin. By internalizing transactions
in cases where markets are thin or nonexistent due to cospecialized
assets or information asymmetries, the TNC makes it possible for
certain forms of economic activity to take place. 52 However, in other
cases, through its own activities, the TNC may make the markets
thicker by transferring knowledge and providing training to its
contractual partners. Indeed, there is a long history of TNCs providing
such training to their suppliers, the impact of which has at times been
quite significant, particularly in developing countries, as new
technologies and organizational methods have become diffused into the
local economy.5 3
Contract research is a case in point. Traditionally, TNCs carried out
R&D within the auspices of the firm and such activity was
geographically concentrated in the home country. 54 However, in recent
years we have seen TNCs extending the range of the R&D activities
that are conducted abroad and also engaging in market-based
exchanges for contract research. Such markets do not come into
existence automatically, but instead require a process whereby potential
market participants create the standards that allow for successful
transactions to take place.
In some cases the process of codification and subsequent training
may help contribute to the emergence of modularity in the market for
intermediate goods, which in turn allows for new entrants to enter the
marketplace.55 Here we can think of technological modularity, as seen
for instance in the emergence of standards such as the Global System
for Mobile Communications that allowed for the explosive growth of
mobile phone services.56 However, we might also think in terms of
organizational modularity, i.e., the development of routines for
52. See David J. Teece, Reflections on the Hymer Thesis and the Multinational
Enterprise, 15 INT'L BUS. REV. 124, 128-31 (2006).
53. See DUNNING & LUNDAN, supra note 29, at 444-50, 559, 573-77.
54. See John H. Dunning & Sarianna M. Lundan, The Internationalization of
Corporate R&D: A Review of the Evidence and Some Policy Implications for Home
Countries, 26 REV. POL'Y RES. 13, 19-20 (2009).
55. Teece, supra note 52, at 134-36.
56. See Aija Leiponen, National Styles in the Setting of Global Standards: The
Relationship between Firms' Standardization Strategies and National Origin, in How
REVOLUTIONARY WAS THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION? NATIONAL RESPONSES, MARKET
TRANSITIONS, AND GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY 338, 339-44 (John Zysman & Abraham Newman
eds., 2006).
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organizing transactions, that become sufficiently clear and codified so
that they too can become diffused in the marketplace and influence the
prevailing standards of how transactions are conducted. Furthermore,
the network structure of the TNC, which is a combination of
transactions that are internal and external to the firm, might be one
way the TNC can overcome the limits set by the availability of
managerial resources and capabilities on the growth of firms, or the so-
called "Penrose effect."
Firms shape markets rather than the other way around, because
firms introduce new routines, and because of the role they play in
redefining the rules of selection in their operating environment. The
need to invest in cospecialized and complementary assets together with
the ability of the firm to cocreate the market makes the prospect of
value creation more credible within the auspices of the firm than purely
over the market.5 7 Indeed, it is organizational innovation and the
development of new business models (rather than product or process
innovation) that lie at the core of the development of so-called "dynamic
capabilities."
The combination of increasing interconnections between
geographically dispersed markets and the greater use of market-based
transactions has intensified the incentives to develop new routines. By
virtue of the nature of their business, TNCs are leading the way in the
development of new capabilities. In line with Jacobides and Winter,5 8 I
suggest that as the transactions coordinated by TNCs come to involve
more market-based than hierarchical coordination, this is likely to
increase the transparency of the sources of firm capabilities within
industry sectors. This is because in industry sectors where market-
based transactions dominate, firms are likely to gain easier access to the
innovations that have allowed other firms to gain lower transaction
costs or to provide higher value. This process is likely to be self-
sustaining, leading to more specialization and less internalization, as
the innovations made by the pioneering firms allow others to reduce the
costs of market transactions.
Conversely, in markets where integrated hierarchical solutions are
dominant, such as in the period of the emergence of the large industrial
firm described by Chandler,59 the opposite is the case. Since the
pioneering firms have no incentive to increase the transparency of
57. See Christos N. Pitelis & David J. Teece, The (New) Nature and Essence of the
Firm, 6 EuR. MGMT. REv. 5, 9 (2009).
58. See Michael G. Jacobides & Sidney G. Winter, The Co-Evolution of Capabilities and
Transaction Costs: Explaining the Institutional Structure of Production, 26 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 395, 401-02 (2005).
59. See CHANDLER, supra note 26, at 8, 14.
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competitive practices, organizational innovations remain hidden inside
integrated firms. Consequently, other firms are likely to find it more
difficult to identify and imitate such practices. This process is also likely
to be self-sustaining, since little innovation can take place between
firms, and any advances remain largely hidden inside integrated firms.
While the degree of internalization at the firm level is in part
influenced by factors such as experience and reputation that predispose
a particular firm to choose (or to persist with) particular forms of
governance,60 the greater use of market-based transactions is also
dependent on the existence and availability of suitable partners. It is
precisely by identifying possible partners, and by transferring the
relevant routines to carry out new types of transactions, that firms
engage in institutional entrepreneurship and influence industry
architectures.
Of course, not all industries are equally amenable to such
restructuring. The incumbents have vested interests in maintaining the
current architecture, and consequently the costs of changing industry
structure, whether by attempting to combine highly specialized players
or by inducing independent firms to take over parts of the value chain,
can be substantial.6 1 For an entrenched industry, exogenous
technological changes or major changes in antitrust regulation are
likely to be required to force the industry structure to change from being
dominated by integrated firms to one where market transactions are
prevalent.
IV. DIFFERENCES IN INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: THE BALANCE
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORDERING
As a result of the transfer of routines and the process of coevolution
in market and nonmarket domains, TNCs shape the institutional
environment in their home and host countries and contribute to mixing
the boundaries between what has traditionally been the role of the state
(the public domain) and what has belonged to the private domain. 62
Since economic markets are not self-regulating but depend on
nonmarket institutions for a stable economic structure and the
60. See John Hagedoorn & Geert Duysters, External Sources of Innovative Capabilities:
The Preference for Strategic Alliances or Mergers and Aquisitions, 39 J. MGMT. STUD. 167,
172-73, 180-82 (2002).
61. See, e.g., Michael G. Jacobides et al., Benefiting from Innovation: Value Creation,
Value Appropriation and the Role of Industry Architectures, 35 RES. POL'Y 1200, 1209
(2006).
62. See Cantwell, Dunning & Lundan, supra note 34, at 577.
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provision of a variety of public goods,6 3 the failures of nonmarket
institutions also matter for the operation and performance of TNCs.64
Thus, the transaction costs faced by firms are likely to be higher
when property rights are not specified and protected by the polity, social
disunity within the community hampers the recruitment and
collaboration of personnel on account of ethnic and other social
divisions, or cultural values discourage people from joining and
participating in wealth-creating activities. While all countries are likely
to suffer from some types of institutional failure, they are particularly
evident in emerging markets, marked by what Khanna, Palepu, and
Sinha called "institutional voids,"65 and what Palazzo and Scherer
named "deficits."66
As with failing markets, TNCs will evaluate different governance
types pertaining to the nonmarket and will consider the possibility of
performing "in house" some nonmarket institutional functions related to
public law and order, social cohesion, and moral engagement. The
nonmarket institutional goods and services associated with these
functions are akin to the "complementary assets" highlighted by Teece 67
because, like economic intermediate products, they are necessary for the
production and marketing of final products.
Legal theory distinguishes between "public" and "private"
orderings6 8 to describe the two principal mechanisms employed to
mitigate market and nonmarket failures.69 Public ordering rests on laws
63. Public goods are defined here as those provided by nonmarket institutions-
particularly, in terms of law and order, social cohesion and cultural engagement in
production and innovation. In principle, they are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable-that is,
everyone can use them without reducing their availability to others. However, it should be
noted that many privatized public services do not meet this definition. This is the case, for
example, with telecommunication networks, transport infrastructure, and power
generation, which are neither nonexcludable nor nonrivalrous in use although the
government as an owner may choose not to exclude specific users.
64. See generally Hoskisson et al., supra note 44 (discussing the challenges faced by
multinational enterprises investing in emerging markets).
65. Tarun Khanna, Krishna G. Palepu & Jayant Sinha, Strategies That Fit Emerging
Markets, HARV. Bus. REv., June 2005, at 63, 64-66.
66. Guido Palazzo & Andreas Georg Scherer, Corporate Social Responsibility,
Democracy, and the Politicization of the Corporation, 33 AcAD. MGMT. REV. 773, 773
(2008).
67. David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. PoL'Y 285, 288-90 (1986).
68. See, e.g., Larry CatA Backer, Multinational Corporations as Objects and Sources of
Transnational Regulation, 14 ILSA J. INTL & COMP. L. 499, 505 (2008).
69. The nonmarket concept also includes nongovernmental (i.e., civil society) failures.
For a discussion of the development of the nonmarket concept through four perspectives,
see Jean J. Boddewyn, Understanding and Advancing the Concept of "Nonmarket," 42
Bus. & Soc'Y 297 (2003).
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and regulations backed by a legal system of civil enforcement and
criminal penalties. Internalization theory and Williamson's
"institutional environments" 70 assume such public ordering, which is
predominant in most developed countries. The primary mean used by
TNCs for obtaining nonmarket intermediate products under public
ordering is financial (e.g., through the payment of taxes, fees, bribes,
and donations) although political influence (e.g., the voting out of
unfavorable politicians and the capture of regulators), trust, status,
reputation, and legitimacy are also employed for that purpose, since
exchanges are often "embedded" in social relations.71
Private ordering is more likely to prevail in markets where the legal
institutions that underlay public ordering are largely missing or
deficient. While public ordering is a "top-down" process that rests on the
threat of the use of sovereign force, private ordering is a consensual
"bottom-up" practice that derives its efficacy and legitimacy from the
continued support of its members. 72 A private ordering system may
allow for exchanges to take place even when pricing in the market is
difficult, property rights are unclear or insecure, and the pursuit of self-
interest is insufficient to guarantee orderly transactions free of
malfeasance and opportunism. In embedded relationships, cooperation
is common among the exchanging parties who conform to shared rules,
norms, and customs, thereby developing a "socialized rationality" and
having the moral obligation to consider the appropriateness of their
actions.
The basis of private ordering is contractual,73 and contract
management and dispute settlement are dealt with directly by the
parties involved or through mutually agreed-upon arbitration schemes.
In lieu of relying on well-defined property rights and contract laws,
exchanges may be embedded in a broad set of relationships with the
same party, so that nonperformance in one exchange could be penalized
in later ones. Reserves of social capital, performance bonds, and third-
party guarantors can help solve contracting problems stemming from
low levels of cohesion and solidarity, with trust playing an important
role.
70. Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of
Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. Scl. Q. 269, 287 (1991).
71. See generally Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The
Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOCIOL. 481 (1985) (presenting a seminal discussion
on the importance of embedded relationships to the execution of economic transactions).
72. Larry CatA Backer, Economic Globalization and the Rise of Efficient Systems of
Global Private Lawmaking: Wal-Mart as Global Legislator, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1739, 1743-
44, 1748-49 (2007).
73. See id. at 1783-84.
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Private ordering is used in emerging markets where exclusionary
groupings of local companies, networks based on kinship ties, and even
membership in criminal organizations predominate in order to
compensate for the failures of public ordering. 74 Private ordering may
also exist in parallel with a strong government that exercises coercive
force through state ministries and agencies that reward or punish
particular firms through permits, purchases, credit, and protection, and
that tend to favor state enterprises.7 5
In terms of transaction costs, a rule-based governance system of the
type found in developed countries involves large costs for drafting,
interpreting, and implementing contract laws, but the marginal cost of
enforcing an additional contract is negligible because the rules are
explicit, impersonal, and standardized. By contrast, transacting in
emerging markets is likely to involve fewer fixed costs but significant
marginal ones because one needs to screen, test, and monitor every
transaction partner. Thus, as the market expands from local to regional,
national, and international levels, the number of business partners
increases, and the marginal cost of relations could rise significantly.
Private ordering may be preferred even in societies where public
ordering is of high quality-as Williamson acknowledged76 -because it
is more flexible and faster in adjusting to changing circumstances.
Thus, it has been used in connection with the emergence of electronic
cross-border markets7 7 and with global challenges such as climate
change, and its practice is also illustrated by the increasing popularity
of private arbitration agreements among firms. In such cases, private
ordering works in the shadow of a well-functioning public ordering
system that provides a degree of continuity and reliability.
The extent to which firms might be willing to engage in some form
of nonmarket internalization is influenced by changing economic and
political ideologies. Social scientists have charted the changing balance
between the public and private domains, following the transformation of
74. See, e.g., Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, Business Groups in Emerging Markets:
Paragons or Parasites?, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 331, 339-41 (2007); Klaus E. Meyer &
Mike W. Peng, Probing Theoretically into Central and Eastern Europe: Transactions,
Resources, and Institutions, 36 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 600, 612 (2005).
75. See generally Mike W. Peng, Institutional Transitions and Strategic Choices, 28
AcAD. MGMT. REV. 275 (2003) (discussing what firms can expect to encounter in terms of
institutional transition as authoritarian governments transfer to more market-based
systems).
76. See Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 608-10 (2000).
77. See Gralf-Peter Calliess, Transnational Consumer Law: Co-Regulation of B2C E-
Commerce, in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELF-GOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL
EcoNOMIc TRANSACTIONS, supra note 43, at 225, 226, 252.
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the modern state in postnational times. This transformation has taken
place along two main axes: one concerning a shift in the key actors from
public to private (e.g., from governments to NGOs and TNCs) and the
other a change in the level of governance from the national to the
supranational or regional level.78 As a consequence, many nonmarket
services are now produced or coproduced by combinations of private
firms and NGOs. 7 9
For example, in emerging markets like Jordan, the workplace rules
in the supplier agreements of Wal-Mart effectively constitute a private
system of regulation, while in the context of Germany, the same rules
were heavily contested and the private ordering instituted by Wal-Mart
was overturned under the public ordering of German law, which
considered Wal-Mart's policies on workplace fraternization to be overly
intrusive.80 At the supranational level, TNCs have been increasingly
involved in the development and drafting of international treaties,
multilateral agreements, and codes of conduct.81
In general, one would expect that in well-ordered societies, the
complementary assets held by local owners are likely to be easier to
transact, whereas the opposite would be the case in burdened societies.
One would also anticipate that when institutional distance is low, the
knowledge and other assets held by the TNC are easier to transact,
while the opposite would be the case when institutional distance is
high.82 What matters then in determining the governance form are the
relative costs that the TNC would incur in acquiring complementary
assets and the costs that the holders of complementary assets would
bear to access the knowledge and other assets of the TNC.
In the case of foreign direct investment between developed
countries, where institutional environments are fairly similar and
public ordering predominates, investors rely on the delivery of public
goods by the key host institutions, and they expect that nonmarket
intermediate products are readily obtainable-mainly through the use
of money to pay taxes, make donations, and finance other transactions
at low costs. In such circumstances, TNCs have many credible
governance options and internalizing nonmarket activities is only
moderately necessary-if at all.
78. See generally TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE STATE? (Stephan Leibfried & Michael Zirn
eds., 2005) (presenting a framework for analyzing state transformation in terms of the
devolution of responsibilities both geographically and in terms of the level of governance).
79. E.g., Andrew King, Cooperation Between Corporations and Environmental Groups:
A Transaction Cost Perspective, 32 AcAD. MGMT. REv. 889, 890 (2007).
80. Backer, supra note 72, at 1762-73.
81. E.g., Ramamurti, supra note 40, at 348-49.
82. See Dean Xu & Oded Shenkar, Institutional Distance and the Multinational
Enterprise, 27 ACAD. MGMT. REv. 608, 610 (2002).
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In the case of investment between two emerging markets, the
institutional voids in the host country require expertise of operating
under private and state orderings-an ability that investing TNCs from
other emerging markets already have.8 3 Since the foreign investor might
not be able to contract for the public goods it needs, the TNC must be
able to transfer to a host country at a low cost the knowledge developed
at home, and only limited internalization may be necessary. The
relatively robust flows of investment into emerging markets by TNCs
from other emerging countries testify to the feasibility of this pattern."
The two patterns that involve investment from developed to
developing countries or vice versa are likely to prove more difficult. For
investment originating in developing countries, the problem is the lack
of experience required to establish effective nonmarket relationships in
developed countries. However, to the extent that the investor possesses
the financial resources necessary to engage in acquisitions, the latter
provide an indirect way of accessing the relevant nonmarket resources
in the host country, although this may be met with political opposition
from the host country.85
In the case of investment by established TNCs in emerging markets,
the problem for the investor is again the low applicability of home
experience when dealing with institutional voids in host countries. The
prevalence of private and public orderings pose notable problems for
outsiders, but to the extent feasible, acquisitions and joint ventures in
the host country can be used to negotiate the nonmarket institutional
environment. Furthermore, TNCs are likely to have broader capabilities
and resources to support counterparties and nonmarket exchange
mechanisms than the other way around. Only if attempts to forge such
cooperation fail are TNCs likely to consider stepping into the nonmarket
themselves, by either procuring the necessary assets or by taking over
the providers of those assets.
V. THE WAY FORWARD: SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
While internalization theory provides a compelling narrative to
answer the question of how firms (or TNCs) arise, the predicted
83. See Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra & Mehmet Gene, Transforming Disadvantages into
Advantages: Developing-Country MNEs in the Least Developed Countries, 39 J. INT'L BUS.
STUD. 957, 975-76 (2008).
84. See U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev., World Investment Report 2009:
Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, xix, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WIR/2009 (2009).
85. For example, this has been the case with respect to Chinese and Russian
investment in the United States and Europe.
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outcomes become less compelling as the firm matures. This is because in
any particular market, full internalization might be the only conceivable
alternative for some firms, while others may find it possible to access
the same resources by means of partial equity purchases, contracts, or a
combination of these. While in some cases the characteristics of what is
being transacted are such that no firm would find it feasible to transact
over the market (e.g., due to information asymmetry), the growing
variety of different types of contractual market interfaces, and the
multiplicity of different types of markets where TNCs transact, suggest
that the TNCs themselves may play a role in generating new
governance alternatives.
The evolutionary process whereby firms adjust their structure to the
uncertainties confronting their value-adding activities, particularly
across borders, is likely to lead to the emergence of new types of firms,
including those that represent hybrids of some elements of public and
private governance. As a consequence, there is a need for a better
understanding of the factors that cause the balance between public and
private governance to shift over time and that enable or encourage
TNCs to internalize more of the kinds of functions normally assumed by
nonmarket actors. While this is most evident in the cases where TNCs
actually engage in the coproduction of public services such as safety,
health, or education, the embedded contractual relations TNCs have
formed with their suppliers and customers can also impact indirectly on
the delivery of services in the nonmarket domain.
Furthermore, such contractual relationships can be unequal in
terms of the balance of power, and various types of costs can be shifted
to the weaker party (for example, this may happen in connection with
contract farmers, suppliers in the production networks of electronics, or
textile firms). The use of extensive contracting to govern the value-
adding activities of the firm raises questions about accountability and
transparency, which at least to some extent can be mitigated by the
engagement of an impartial third party verification system. While large
TNCs may not be beholden to territorially circumscribed law, they are
beholden to their shareholders and customers, whose threat to
withdraw support provides an incentive for firms to adjust their
behavior in order to maintain legitimacy, although the effectiveness of
this tool varies across industries.
From a policy perspective, there is thus a need to consider a much
broader political role of TNCs than is typically envisaged in the
literature, which has tended to view the relationship between
governments and TNCs as bilateral and adversarial, thereby reflecting
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the "obsolescing bargains" struck several decades ago.86 Here, TNC
participation in various kinds of public-private partnerships has the
potential to bring about more inclusive forms of governance to the
investor-state relationship. Finally, the rise of different forms of
contractual relationships should prompt scholars from both the legal
and economic traditions to make greater use of contracts as sources of
data concerning the evolution of governance forms. The practical
difficulties of obtaining access to such sources aside, empirical research
using contracts as a means to chart the evolving responses of firms to
the uncertainties arising from their expanded social and political role
could yield new insights both in terms of firm strategies and the
formulation of public policy.
86. See generally Robert Grosse, The Bargaining View of Business-Government
Relations, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT REIATIONS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY, supra note 40, at 273, 276 (presenting the evolution of the bargaining
relationship between governments and multinational enterprises).
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